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FOREWORD
What are the policy implications regarding proliferation and
counterproliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states?
How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower
confrontation as defined by the cold war's elaborate system of
constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction,
and counter-value and counter-force targeting? How can U.S.
policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear
threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran,
and Syria?
These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important
questions addressed by the author in this monograph. In his
analysis, Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or
more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year
2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners
might use in assessing U.S. interests in preempting the use of
nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use.
Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative
that defense strategists, policymakers, and military
professionals think about the "unthinkable." In the interest of
fostering debate on this important subject, the Strategic Studies
Institute commends this insightful monograph to your attention.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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NUCLEAR THREATS FROM SMALL STATES
For decades, the United States has pursued nuclear
nonproliferation as an important national security goal. At
times, this objective was masked or even compromised by the
overarching needs of managing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance and
maintaining the Western Alliance. As the cold war faded, the
problem of proliferation assumed an ever more prominent place in
U.S. national security strategy. During the Bush administration,
this issue was especially visible when the defeat of Iraq in the
Gulf War showed how close that nation was to having developed
nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration's national security
policy puts priority on nonproliferation and assigns to the
Department of Defense the mission of "counterproliferation"—that
is, the strategic means of dealing with new nations that cross
the threshold and actually obtain weapons of mass destruction.1
This monograph focuses on counterproliferation, with special
attention to crises involving Third World states that, in the
near term, may produce or acquire militarily usable nuclear
weapons. It addresses four questions of interest to national
security planners and policymakers:
• What is the likelihood of Third World nations obtaining
and using nuclear weapons in ways that endanger U.S. interests?
• Under what circumstances might the United States turn to
military force if faced with Third World nuclear crises?
• How might the United States apply its military capability
in responding to nuclear crises in regional settings?
• What strategic and force structure guidelines should be
followed in planning to deal with Third World nuclear
proliferation?
NUCLEAR CHALLENGES
By the year 2000, seven so-called Third World countries
along with Israel can be posited to have acquired potentially
usable nuclear forces—weapons and delivery systems. These
countries are India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and Syria. Some of these states may have already crossed the
nuclear threshold, but none has declared that it has done so. All
have a national interest in either obtaining nuclear forces or
retaining and possibly improving nuclear forces they may
presently possess.
The means as well as the motivations shaping the nuclear
ambitions of these states vary widely. Along with Israel, some
Third World countries now have a substantial capacity to produce
nuclear weapons themselves (Pakistan, India, and North Korea). By
the end of the decade, these nations could develop relatively
sophisticated nuclear forces consisting of dozens of weapons

capable of delivery by advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles
of medium range. Others (Iran, Libya, and Syria) may be forced to
purchase weapons or high-grade fissionable material from external
sources. The nuclear arsenals of these states will tend to be
relatively small and unsophisticated, consisting of a few weapons
outfitted for delivery by aircraft or short-range missiles. In
one case (Iraq), international restraints would have to be
overcome for nuclear weapons to be obtained, whether through
indigenous or external means. We assume that Iraq would be able
to acquire a nuclear force of moderate capacity by the end of the
decade.2
Israel, alone among the nations cited, is and will
presumably remain a U.S. ally. Although a nuclear-armed Israel
can complicate U.S. security interests, nuclear weapons in the
hands of the seven other states can lead to more direct
challenges. A few years ago, the list of potentially worrisome
small nuclear powers would have included South Africa, Brazil,
and Argentina, but these states have rolled back their programs.
A number of the new nations formed after the collapse of the
Soviet Union have inherited nuclear weapons. This analysis,
however, deals with only Third World nuclear challenges.
Likelihood of Nuclear Use.
The likelihood that the eight nations listed above would
actually use or threaten to use nuclear weapons is, in brief,
significant enough for the United States to take this possibility
seriously. Moreover, the chances of use are driven by a number of
rational factors, not by the specter of irrational governments
lurching out of control or the prospect of nuclear-armed
terrorists. These factors can be identified as contributing
singly or in combination to the likelihood of nuclear use by
Third World states.

Latent Conflicts. Regional rivalries will inevitably lead to
crises and armed conflicts between two small nuclear states or
between a nuclear-armed nation and a nonnuclear adversary. Crises
can turn into military conflict, and, at any point in such
dynamic situations, nuclear threats and use may well become
deliberate instruments of policy. This would be more likely to
occur if a nuclear-armed state, embroiled in a conflict and
deficient in conventional forces, starts to lose a conventional
war and is facing a nonnuclear adversary.
Weakened Constraints. During the cold war era, the United
States and the USSR were wary that regional conflicts might
escalate into a full-blown nuclear confrontation. Washington and
Moscow intervened to dampen local nuclear conflicts and offered
security umbrellas to their allies and friends. But now that
these constraints and connections are weak, small nuclear states
may feel isolated and more prone to use whatever military means
are necessary to protect their interests. Third World nuclear

states may not be inhibited from nuclear use for fear that the
United States or Russia will retaliate against them or that the
world community will punish them. President Clinton has
threatened to respond with all means necessary against North
Korea if that country uses nuclear weapons,3 but the credibility
and effectiveness of this policy have yet to be tested.

Dynamics of Deterrence. The United States and the USSR spent
decades developing a stable nuclear relationship based on an
understanding of mutual deterrence that evolved through years of
difficult dialogue and debate. An arcane set of doctrinal
principles slowly emerged, and nuclear force postures on both
sides were eventually guided, at least in theory, by these
principles. But deterrence may not be seen the same way or work
the same way with newly formed small nuclear states. Strategic
discourse between two small nuclear-armed adversaries may be
nonexistent, raising the prospect of a breakdown in deterrence at
the regional level. New Third World nuclear states may not be
inhibited from attacking nonnuclear states in their region if, as
suggested above, extended deterrence flowing from the threat of
superpower retaliation is not seen as credible.
Intelligence Gaps. Third World states tend to have imperfect
and incomplete intelligence information about their relative
positions in a conflict. Policymakers in these countries
therefore assume the worst and may decide to launch nuclear
weapons prematurely, based on the misperception that an opponent
is about to conduct a preemptive strike against its nuclear
arsenal. A situation along these lines almost developed in 1992
during a clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, with the
United States stepping in to provide information and diffuse the
crisis.4
Technical Deficiencies. Small nuclear forces, especially in
the hands of technically unsophisticated countries, may well be
deficient in command and control arrangements. These forces may
also be vulnerable to attack, at least until relatively
survivable launch platforms are acquired. These features increase
the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. When combined
with less-than-perfect information, the chances of nuclear use in
a Third World setting increase further due to "the reciprocal
fear of surprise attack"—a concept coined during the early days
of the U.S.-USSR strategic balance when the superpower deterrent
relationship was not yet stable.5
U.S. Interests and Stakes.
For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that none of the
Third World nuclear states being considered will be capable of
credibly attacking the U.S. homeland with long-range delivery
systems by the year 2000. Nor is it assumed that these states
will attempt to sneak a nuclear bomb into the United States by
unconventional means (e.g., suitcase bombs in commercial aircraft

or ocean freighters carrying clandestine devices). Given these
assumptions, why should the United States be concerned if Third
World states in remote places use nuclear weapons?
Following is a review of U.S. interests that could be
endangered if a Third World nuclear crisis arose. Not all these
interests would necessarily be challenged in every particular
Third World nuclear crisis, but the actions we take and the risks
we run will be governed, in part, by the range of interests at
stake and their relative importance.

Risks to U.S. Citizens and Forces. Protecting U.S. nationals
living abroad, as well as defending U.S. military forces
stationed overseas, is a primary responsibility of our president.
By the year 2000, thousands of U.S. nationals and substantial
numbers of U.S. military forces will be in foreign lands and
vulnerable to potential nuclear attack by nuclear-armed regional
states. This is true when we look in Asia, South Korea and Japan,
the Indian subcontinent, or the Middle East.
Risks to U.S. Allies. Whether dictated by formal treaties or
not, the United States would place prevention of nuclear use
against our allies or close friends very high on our list of
national priorities. In some cases, the existence of U.S. bases
on the soil of these countries would strengthen our
determination. Examples of nonnuclear nations under a potential
nuclear threat are Japan, South Korea, Egypt, the Gulf
Cooperation Council states, and Italy.
Risks of Escalation. Even though the cold war is over,
localized nuclear use could risk "horizontal" escalation, whereby
adjacent countries would feel forced to use their nuclear
weapons. There is also a risk of "vertical" escalation, where one
of the larger nuclear powers could become involved. An example of
the former might be an Iran-Iraq conflict with one or both sides
nuclear-armed, forcing Israel to make a military move with its
posited nuclear systems. An example of the latter is a Korean war
where North Korean nuclear weapons might bring China's nuclear
arsenal into the picture.
Humanitarian Concerns. Any nuclear use would create enormous
devastation from blast and fallout effects in the target country
and adjacent states. The Chernobyl incident, orders of magnitude
less serious than a nuclear detonation, has not yet been
forgotten, and its consequences linger. The United States has
responded to natural disasters and human suffering abroad in such
cases as Bangladesh and Somalia; it's difficult to believe we
would not, as a nation, respond to a nuclear-use disaster.
Risk to Resources. A regional nuclear conflict could
jeopardize our access to overseas resources or our ability to
conduct trade in or near certain areas. Nuclear conflict in the
Middle East, which would destroy oil fields or block shipping, is
the example that springs to mind. The Gulf War, which did not

involve nuclear weapons, highlighted this problem. But nuclear
use in Asia, whether on the Korean Peninsula or against Japan,
could also have serious economic consequences.

Risk of Precedent. Nuclear weapons have not been used in
anger since the raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United
States has sought to maintain the nuclear "firebreak" and to
persuade existing or potential nuclear states that these weapons
should not be used as military or diplomatic instruments.
Although use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict could
strengthen the barriers against subsequent use, it could have the
opposite effect in certain situations and stimulate interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons.
Conclusion.
It might be useful to put the Third World nuclear danger in
perspective. On the one hand, these dangers are less severe but
more likely than nuclear risks in the context of the relatively
stable East-West balance that characterized the last few decades
of the cold war. On the other hand, the presence of nuclear
weapons in the Third World makes future regional crises more
severe but less likely than the conventional Third World crises
we have expected and experienced thus far. If nothing else, U.S.
planners and policymakers need to pay more attention to
prospective Third World nuclear threats, lest we risk facing this
new challenge unprepared.
PROPENSITY TO USE FORCE
Whether the United States would turn to the actual use of
military force in dealing with a future Third World nuclear
crisis is a complex issue. A highly specific but operationally
significant question is whether we would decide to preemptively
attack and attempt to destroy a hostile Third World country's
nuclear force before it can be used, assuming that deterrence no
longer seems to be working and that defenses cannot be relied
upon to protect our interests. Whether and how U.S. military
force is used would clearly depend on the details of each case,
but we can develop guidelines before crises arise to assist in
preparing contingency plans. The approach we will follow is to
present plausible hypotheses about the propensity of U.S. leaders
to use military force preemptively and then "test" these
hypotheses against a range of representative scenarios involving
the Third World nuclear states of interest.
Setting the Scenarios.
Seven scenarios are sketched below, posited to take place by
the year 2000. They are all familiar crises, but with the crucial
exception that one or more of the regional protagonists is now
assumed to possess usable nuclear weapons. The scenarios
deliberately stop short of actual nuclear use by a regional state

as a means of focusing on the role of U.S. military forces for
purposes of deterrence and preemption. Each scenario can, of
course, be "pushed" to the point where a regional protagonist
uses nuclear weapons, thus raising the question of whether and
how the United States might use military force for purposes of
retaliation.

Scenario 1. In the midst of a leadership succession crisis,
North Korea launches a massive conventional attack against South
Korea, including an attack on U.S. forces stationed in South
Korea. Republic of Korea (ROK) forces counterattack while an
increasing number of U.S. military reinforcements enter the
country. North Korea threatens to use its nuclear-tipped missiles
against Japan as well as ROK and U.S. targets. The tide turns,
and allied forces push the attacking army back across the
Demilitarized Zone. U.S. intelligence sources detect North Korean
missiles being placed on full alert, with associated arming and
fuzing steps suggesting imminent launch...
Scenario 2. Iraq convinces the world community that it has
complied with the U.N. mandate, but manages to successfully
pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program and acquire a new
arsenal of mobile missiles. Estimating that the United States is
too preoccupied with domestic problems to intervene, Iraqi
conventional forces once again invade Kuwaiti territory. Kuwaiti
forces slow down the attack and the government requests U.S.
military assistance. Saudi Arabia also requests U.S. assistance
and offers the United States permission to use its ports and
bases. Iraqi threats mount, and its mobile missiles are dispersed
and put on alert...
Scenario 3. The peace process falls completely apart and
Israel moves to annex the West Bank. An Arab coalition, including
a nuclear-armed Syria, strikes back with massive conventional
force against the invading Israeli army. The Arab coalition hopes
that Syria's nuclear capability will deter Israeli nuclear use.
Israel launches a massive conventional counterattack that pushes
Arab forces out of the West Bank. Israeli conventional forces
also attack Syria's nuclear capabilities, but fail to destroy all
nuclear-armed delivery systems. Syria threatens to use its
remaining nuclear weapons against massed Israeli armed forces.
The United States detects the arming and fuzing of Syrian
missiles...
Scenario 4. Iran, governed by Islamic Fundamentalists,
acquires nuclear weapons from one of the former Soviet Republics.
In the meantime, Iraq, having rebuilt its military forces to
include its own nuclear arsenal, launches a surprise conventional
attack into Iran to retake territory, overthrow the regime,
destroy the army, and negate Iran's nuclear capability. The
attack fails to destroy all of Iran's nuclear forces. Iran
prepares for a massive counterattack. Both sides issue nuclear
threats and move all available mobile missiles out of garrison...

Scenario 5. This scenario is a replay of the shipping war in
the Gulf (Earnest Will), with Iran threatening to block the
Straits of Hormuz but in possession of a small number of
externally acquired nuclear weapons. U.S. naval forces escorting
commercial ships are vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear strike. The
United States continues its escort operations and moves
additional forces into the area. Iran announces it is prepared to
use nuclear weapons either against U.S. forces or countries in
the region friendly to the United States...
Scenario 6. Pakistan launches a conventional strike into
Kashmir but soon finds itself losing the war as superior Indian
conventional forces counterattack. As part of this counterstrike,
India attempts to de-nuclearize Pakistan by preemptively
attacking Pakistani air bases and known missile sites. A few
Pakistani nuclear-armed mobile missiles survive and the
government of Pakistan threatens to destroy the massed Indian
army unless India retreats. India returns the threat...
Scenario 7. Libya purchases a few nuclear weapons and
supports another terrorist attack against U.S. nationals in
Europe. This time, Libya threatens nuclear weapons use if the
United States conducts military reprisals. The United States
launches selected conventional strikes against Libyan
headquarters and known nuclear sites, but a few Libyan mobile
missiles survive. Libya directs a specific threat against the
Italian government and U.S. bases in southern Italy...
Testing the Hypotheses.
As noted earlier, we assume that deterrence is about to fail
in connection with each scenario. Given this assumption, we offer
four hypotheses about the factors influencing U.S. decisions on
whether to use our military power to preemptively destroy the
Third World nuclear force in question:
• The higher the U.S. interests at stake, the stronger the
desire to use force to prevent nuclear use.
• The greater the likelihood of imminent nuclear use by an
adversary, the more pressure there will be for turning to
military solutions.
• The more sophisticated a nuclear opponent, the less likely
that U.S. decisionmakers will consider use of military force.
• The more domestic and international political opposition
to the use of military force, the greater the chance that
decisionmakers will rule out this option.

U.S. Interests. In all cases, the United States is concerned
about preventing nuclear use for nonproliferation, stability, and
humanitarian reasons, but the fundamental U.S. interests at stake

vary across the different scenarios.
U.S. interests are very high in the case of Korea. North
Korea's nuclear capabilities threaten U.S. forces in South Korea
and Japan, and endanger the populations of both these countries.
Moreover, we are tied to South Korea and Japan by security
alliances. We also want to prevent a Libyan nuclear strike
against Italy, a NATO ally. U.S. interests are high in the case
of a nuclear-armed Iraq for different reasons: to protect oil
resources and the sovereignty of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In the case of Syria and an Arab-Israeli war, we have a
long-standing commitment to the Israeli nation, which, in this
case, needs to be balanced against the high stakes we have in our
relations with the Arab world and its oil resources. We might
well consider counterforce strikes against Syrian nuclear forces,
while restraining Israel from using its nuclear power—unless of
course Israel destroys Syria's nuclear arsenal first.
U.S. interests in the case of Iran are moderate to high,
partly to ensure that Gulf oil will keep flowing and partly to
protect U.S. ships in the area. A nuclear replay of the Iran-Iraq
War is of low to moderate interest to the United States, raising
questions of whether oil resources will be endangered and of the
risk of a wider war affecting Israel and Saudi Arabia. Finally,
in the Indo-Pak case, U.S. interests are limited to preventing or
containing nuclear use and protecting U.S. nationals that might
not have been evacuated.

Imminent Use. This factor greatly depends on the details of
the scenario, but some generic observations can be made. In
situations where U.S. intelligence detects the arming and fuzing
of nuclear warheads, and does so with great reliability, nuclear
use would be considered imminent—as in the Korean and
Arab-Israeli scenarios. At this "peak period" of decision, U.S.
policymakers must recognize that deterrence is about to fail, and
face a difficult choice between two risky actions:
• Launching a preemptive counterforce strike, which may not
be successful and could cause both actual and political fallout,
or
• Taking no offensive actions, and hoping that the adversary
will not launch his missiles or that available missile defenses
will intercept any such attacks.
In other scenarios, where there are nuclear threats and
force deployments but no sign of imminent use, U.S. leaders can
continue to try diplomatic and economic means to deter use.
Military forces can be applied for this purpose by moving them to
the area, putting them on alert, and conducting exercises. U.S.
officials can also issue warnings of dire consequences if nuclear
weapons are used.

Sophistication of Opponent. In considering military
counterforce, U.S. policymakers must calculate the feasibility of
success. This creates a prospective dilemma: Would we attack when
our interests are seriously threatened in order to prevent
localized nuclear use, even if we are not confident of success?
Or would we use force aggressively only when we are sure of an
effective outcome, even if this meant accepting the severe
consequences of nuclear use by a Third World state?
Our interests are extremely high in the case of Korea, but
our capacity to effectively preempt against a relatively large,
hardened, and dispersed target set is low, which highlights the
dilemma noted above. We would be more capable of conducting
relatively effective attacks against a rejuvenated but moderately
sophisticated Iraqi nuclear program, learning from our past
experience and assuming our intelligence information is accurate.
This could be an instance where high interest might be matched by
usable military power.
In the case of Indo-Pak, where there is a coincidence of
relatively low interests and high to moderately sophisticated
arsenals, the decision would presumably go against preemption.
Here is a situation where low interests and nonusable military
force are aligned. The case of Libya threatening Italy, on the
other hand, is characterized by relatively high U.S. interest and
a relatively unsophisticated nuclear arsenal, suggesting a
greater propensity to contemplate a U.S. preemptive move. This is
also true in the case of Syria threatening Israel, although the
Israelis may de-nuclearize their enemy before we act. In the
Iran-Iraq missile war and the Iran "Earnest Will" case, we see
moderate to low capabilities and moderate U.S. interest. Here the
issue is whether the smaller risk of military action is worth
taking, recognizing that the stakes involved are modest.

Political Acceptability. Military calculations and strategic
assessments by themselves will not determine whether the United
States initiates an action of such import as launching a
preemptive attack in a time of nuclear crisis. Congressional
attitudes and U.S. public opinion, as well as world opinion
generally, will be very much taken into account by the President
and his advisors.
In the Korean war and Iraqi invasion scenarios, U.S.
domestic and international public opinion would probably support
active military action. Both adversaries would undoubtedly be
seen as rogue states which have flaunted U.N. mandates. In the
case of Libya, support might also be high, given Libya's past
record and the fact that a U.S. ally is under the nuclear gun.
Falling in the middle range of moderate or mixed support
would be the cases of Iran in the Gulf and Syria in connection
with an Arab-Israeli war. The former would raise the specter of
an oil cutoff, but the situation would not necessarily be seen by
the U.S. public and the world community as warranting such

drastic action. The latter situation would raise enormous debates
in the United States over whether we should engage in a nuclear
conflict to protect Israel, given that nation's own capabilities
and the critical importance of preserving relations with the Arab
states.
The Indo-Pak and Iran-Iraq scenarios would probably not
engender strong political support for serious U.S. military
actions. Diplomatic and economic instruments would be favored.

Striking the Balance. As suggested earlier, decisionmakers
would have to balance the four countervailing factors in deciding
whether to launch a preemptive military strike. Table 1 rates
these factors in relationship to each of the scenarios.
Imminence of
Nuclear Use

Sophistication
of Opponent

Political

Scenario
Acceptability

U.S. Interests

North Korean
Invasion
Iraq (Gulf War)
Syria (ArabIsraeli War)
Iran-Iraq
Missiles
Iran (EARNEST
WILL)
Indo-Pak
(Kashmir)
Libya Threat

Very High

High

High

High

High
High

Moderate
High

Moderate
Low*

Moderate
Moderate

Moderate to Low

Moderate

Low/Moderate

Low

Moderate to High

Low

Low

Moderate

Low

Low

High/High

Low

High

Low

Low

High

*Israeli capabilities are high, but it is assumed that the United States would
not consider targeting this force.

Table 1.

Propensity to Preempt.

MILITARY OPTIONS
In discussing the propensity to use force, we highlighted
the particular question of whether U.S. leaders would consider
preemptive strikes against small nuclear states under certain
crisis conditions. We now explore more broadly and systematically
the issue of what range of military options could further U.S.
interests in dealing with regional nuclear crises before and
after nuclear use by a Third World adversary.
Before Nuclear Use.
During this phase, the U.S. objective would be to prevent
nuclear use. Five strategies can support this objective.

Dissuading or deterring the adversary not to use nuclear
weapons. Missions to accomplish this strategy primarily involve

posturing and positioning military forces to demonstrate resolve
and imply that severe actions entailing the actual use of U.S.
military force might be forthcoming. Forces and activities to be
employed could include forward- basing strategic bombers and
tactical aircraft, placing strategic missiles on alert, moving
carrier battle groups closer to the country in question, flying
reconnaissance aircraft over potential targets, and conducting
joint and combined exercises in the region. Nuclear capable as
well as conventional systems could be used, accompanied by
appropriate high-level statements and warnings by senior
officials.
Care should be taken, however, not to posture and threaten
to the point that the opponent, fearing a U.S. preemptive attack,
decides to launch his own nuclear weapons first. In the extreme,
conventional forces such as cruise missiles could be used to
attack high-value nonnuclear weapons targets in the adversary
country to make our threats credible. But this is risky and can
stimulate rather than deter nuclear use by the adversary.

Neutralizing the ability of a Third World country to use its
nuclear weapons. In theory, this option would entail the use of
externally based devices to remotely disable the nuclear- related
command, control, and communications network in a target country
or neutralize the arming and fuzing mechanism on the adversary's
nuclear weapons. Theoretically, various techniques could be
potentially useful in this regard, such as electronic warfare and
long-distance lasers housed in satellites. In practice, these
technologies do not exist, and it is not likely that reliable
systems with such capabilities will be available within the next
10 to 15 years.6
Destroying enemy nuclear weapons before they are launched.
This strategy involves a preemptive counterforce strike against
all known nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems, both
on-line and backup. Conventional forces would be preferable for
this mission, because it would be politically difficult for the
United States to justify striking first with nuclear weapons to
prevent a smaller state from using its nuclear weapons. Moreover,
nuclear weapons attacks would cause serious collateral damage and
radioactive fallout. Depending on geography, base availability,
and the size and sophistication of the target set, the United
States could use a wide range of weapon systems to conduct a
counterforce strike—strategic bombers, conventionally tipped
strategic missiles, land- and sea-based tactical air, and cruise
missiles.
Successful execution of such a mission is very demanding.
Unless we faced an extremely small and unsophisticated force in a
country where our intelligence was superb, we would almost surely
not be able to identify and locate all nuclear targets—mobile,
fixed, and hidden. Even if all targets were known by U.S.
intelligence, destroying all of them simultaneously to avoid
launchings under attack could not be guaranteed. Failure to fully

and effectively accomplish this mission raises the prospect of
nuclear retaliation against U.S. forces or allies.

Capturing and disarming enemy nuclear forces before they can
be used or deployed in more survivable modes. This strategy
involves gaining physical control over the enemy's nuclear
weapons, whether in storage or installed on delivery systems.
Potentially, this is a job for U.S. special forces— inserting
themselves clandestinely in enemy territory, finding all the
nuclear weapons, and capturing or permanently disarming them. As
a practical matter, the chances of successfully accomplishing
such a mission are extremely low. Further, attempting the mission
runs the risk of U.S. forces being discovered, captured,
displayed publicly, or possibly executed. On balance, the risks
seem to outweigh feasible gains.
Protecting U.S. forces and other endangered targets. If a
Third World adversary is convinced that U.S. defensive systems
can provide protection from nuclear attacks against U.S. forces,
bases, or allies, deterrence would be strengthened. Moreover,
both active and passive defenses can help make preemptive strikes
more feasible by protecting targets against any adversary nuclear
systems that survive a counterforce strike or those that are
launched on warning of an impending U.S. attack. Passive
defenses, such as shelters and radiation protection, are
marginally useful, but active defenses—both air and missile
defenses—are potentially capable of making a significant
difference. Of these, ballistic missile defenses are the most
important to deploy and the most challenging to develop, given
the nature of the evolving Third World threat.
The United States is pursuing a number of theater missile
defense programs, including land-based systems such as the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based
systems such as the SM-2 deployed on Aegis cruisers.7 By the year
2000, some of these systems will be able to provide some
protection for particular types of targets facing missile threats
of various levels of sophistication, but it is unlikely that we
will have high confidence in being able to intercept all incoming
ballistic missiles that could be launched in the scenarios we
postulated. Also, unless defensive systems had been predeployed
at an earlier stage,8 the United States will have to solve the
problem of moving enough of them into the appropriate theater in
time to respond to a crisis.
After Nuclear Use.
If the United States fails to prevent or fully protect
against nuclear use, policymakers will face the issue of how
military forces should be applied after a Third World nation has
actually used one or more nuclear weapons. It is important to
recognize that even limited use of nuclear weapons is a unique
event. Apart from political and policy implications, the

devastation that would be caused by small numbers of nuclear
weapons used against forces or cities would be magnitudes greater
than "normal" wartime damage.
U.S. military objectives after Third World nuclear use could
be shaped by the number and nature of the targets destroyed. For
analytic purposes, three broad objectives can be identified:
limiting damage, defeating the attacker militarily, and punishing
the perpetrator.

Destroying any residual nuclear weapons to limit further
damage. Unlike the situation before nuclear use, the United
States might now contemplate using its own nuclear weapons to
accomplish this task. Yet even if U.S. nuclear use made military
sense, the broader question of whether we, as a superpower,
should respond in kind to nuclear use is extremely controversial.
Moral as well as political issues are involved. Even in strategic
terms, it is unclear whether responding in kind would deter
further nuclear use by graphically demonstrating the consequences
of such an action or whether such a decision would show that we
are prepared to use our nuclear might and thereby stimulate
proliferation.
Defeating the aggressor militarily by attacking all military
targets, conventional as well as nuclear. The purpose of this
objective would be a combination of limiting damage and crippling
the capacity of the attacker to make war, as in the case of Iraq
in DESERT STORM. This approach might make sense if the attacker
used nuclear weapons in a limited fashion against only military
targets. It would send a message to other nations contemplating
nuclear weapons programs or use of nuclear forces already in
their possession. Conventional weapons would be the system of
choice, because nuclear weapons would be neither technically
necessary nor politically acceptable.
Punishing a perpetrator by retaliating against the enemy's
basic infrastructure or possibly against urban-industrial
centers. Such devastating actions would certainly send a strong
message, but it is questionable whether they would be judged by
world opinion as appropriate, or whether they would help deter
further nuclear use by small states. A crucial issue here is
whether the United States should use conventional or nuclear
weapons to conduct large-scale retaliatory missions. Nuclear
weapons would be more "cost-effective," but, for political
reasons, no U.S. president would find it easy to order such acts.
Perhaps such extreme U.S. reactions could be considered proper
and proportionate if the Third World attacker had deliberately
used nuclear weapons to destroy urban centers with enormous
attendant civilian fatalities.
The Nuclear Hedge.
When facing a nuclear-armed Third World adversary, U.S.

forces would have to be prepared to operate in a nuclear
environment. This would be the case during deterrent and
preemptive phases and also after Third World nuclear use if any
nuclear weapons remain on enemy soil.
Some of the military actions that U.S. forces might take to
hedge against nuclear threats could dilute the effectiveness of
the counterproliferation missions these same forces might be
asked to conduct:
• Dispersal of units, such as ground forces and naval groups
at sea, would be prudent; but dispersal can weaken the capacity of
our forces to project power and overcome defenses.
• U.S. seaborne and airborne forces should stay out of range
when facing Third World nuclear threats; but not displaying our
power could make deterrence less successful, and attacking from a
distance would make counterforce strikes less effective.
• Active protection can prevent our forces from being
completely vulnerable to nuclear attack; but this requires that
offensive forces remain under the protection of theater ballistic
missile defense (BMD) and could limit their freedom of action to
execute counterproliferation missions.
• Passive defenses, such as "hardening" of systems, could
limit the severity of Third World nuclear attacks; but such
countermeasures could inhibit the effectiveness of offensive
forces by reducing flexibility, increasing weight, and requiring
specialized training.
Summary.
The option or combination of options that make sense would
be decided on a case-by-case basis, but plans should be made to
provide the full range of choices to U.S. policymakers. Among the
criteria to be considered in selecting military options are the
following:
• What would the action accomplish militarily?
• What would be the technical confidence of success?
• What military risks would be faced?
• What political goals would be served?
• What political constraints would have to be dealt with?
• What penalties would be incurred by taking "nuclear
hedging" actions?
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Four conclusions for U.S. policymakers and planners can be
drawn from the analysis presented.
Conclusion 1: The Problem Is Real.
Third World states are acquiring nuclear weapons and the
means to deliver them. Before the year 2000, the world might well
see one or more of these states using nuclear weapons in a
regional setting. It is difficult to assume otherwise, given the
potential for conflict and the political instabilities
surrounding these emerging nuclear states, combined with the
technically unsophisticated characteristics of some small nuclear
forces. The prospect of regional nuclear use creates risks to
U.S. security interests. Our forces, citizens, and allies would
be gravely endangered. Global stability also could be jeopardized
once the barrier against nuclear use is penetrated.
Conclusion 2: Planning Is Essential.
U.S. policymakers need to focus on how to dissuade small
nuclear states from actually using their weapons or threatening
such use in an attempt to coerce others. Declaratory policies
warning such states to eschew nuclear use need to be backed by
concrete military planning to develop capabilities to deter,
protect against, and, if necessary, destroy hostile Third World
nuclear forces. Special counterproliferation strategies and force
packages should be developed. Although we must retain powerful
nuclear forces of our own, we should emphasize acquiring
offensive conventional forces that have effective counterforce
potential as well as developing credible theater missile
defenses. It is not correct to assume that such capabilities
would automatically be subsumed within a force structure designed
to deter larger nuclear threats or to prevail in major regional
contingencies facing conventionally armed opponents.9
Conclusion 3: Execution Is Difficult.
Even with careful and high priority counterproliferation
planning, U.S. policymakers would face difficult choices in
dealing with Third World nuclear crises. It would be particularly
difficult to judge whether to intervene and when to move beyond
deterrence and actively apply U.S. military power in an attempt
to disarm an enemy's nuclear force before it is used. U.S.
leaders, under the pressure of a fast-breaking crisis, would
experience "Hobson's choice" in balancing the failure to act
early enough to head off nuclear use against the failure of
acting too early and precipitating such use. Once nuclear use
occurs, how to respond militarily would create a new set of
uncertain and unpleasant choices. Whether available theater
defensive systems can help resolve these dilemmas and offer
acceptable policy options remains to be seen.

Conclusion 4: Think About the "New" Unthinkable.
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Solutions to the problem of dealing with Third World nuclear
threats are not obvious, whether approached from diplomatic,
economic, or military perspectives. To move towards a solution
requires far more attention be paid to addressing this problem
than has been the case in recent years. There needs to be a
recognition that the challenges posed by Third World nuclear
states create differences in kind, not simply differences in
degree, compared with both traditional cold war nuclear challenges
and the conventional contingencies currently driving our
strategic planning. The stakes, risks, constraints, and
uncertainties associated with this emerging nuclear problem are
unique. Mistakes are costly and largely irreversible, even if
limited nuclear use occurs in a distant regional setting. The
United States should not face this challenge alone, but should
exert leadership in organizing the industrialized democracies to
coordinate counterproliferation strategies.
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